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Political life in Argentina is characterized by a particularly active culture of social protest.
This is a key element to understanding political dynamics throughout the 21st century.
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Student protest against Macri's reforms. Argentina 2018. Wikimedia Commons.
The openMovements series invites leading social scientists to share their research results
and perspectives on contemporary social struggles.
The evolution of Argentina in the last few years highlights the dispute for territory between
opposing social forces. There are three stages to this dispute which broadly describe the
swings of the country's political pendulum.
The first stage corresponds to the period marked by the crisis of 2001: it expresses the
collapse of the neoliberal hegemony of the 1990s. It includes President Fernando De la
Rúa's (1999-2000, Radical Civic Union-Alliance) resignation in December of that year and it
stretches up to 2003, when a new elected government takes charge. 
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The second stage corresponds to the cycle of the governments of the Justice Party (PJ)
and the Front for Victory (FPV), beginning with the presidency of Néstor Kirchner (2003-
2007), and then followed by that of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2007-2015).
This is the cycle during which a critical relationship with the neoliberal legacy is attempted
through the promotion of a socio-economic model more closely related to the home market
and with a greater State role in the running of the economy and in managing social
protections. 
Finally, the last stage begins with the inauguration of Mauricio Macri (Republican Proposal:
Let's Change) in 2015 which, honoring the name of the electoral coalition, carries out
policies contrasting with the previous cycle and resumes the neoliberal reform agenda.
Disobedient crowds
In Argentina, the 21st century began, in historical terms, with the so-called crisis of 2001.
The mechanism of the crisis leading to the collapse of the neoliberal hegemony cannot be
reduced to only its economic components; the impossibility of paying back a growing
external debt, the multi-faceted resistance to adjustment plans and their social
consequences must also be taken into account.
It is particularly important to note that the social composition of this resistance, as it is
usually the case in processes of resistance to neoliberalism, was multiple and varied. 
There were strikes, mobilizations and a growing wave of looting in shops, and the protest
reached its highest point on December 19 and 20. The President declared a state of siege
on the night of the 19 to try and contain collective action. Far from its expected result, there
was a sudden surge of generalized civil disobedience. 
The challenge to the presidential move was a claim for his resignation: "Let’s throw them
all out, let’s not leave a single one there" became the slogan of the mobilizations.
Its epicenter was the middle layers of the population - the original social base of the
government: in several neighborhoods of Buenos Aires, the response to the President's
speech announcing the state of siege was a massive banging of pots and pans and
spontaneous demonstrations which spread rapidly throughout the city.
The challenge to the presidential move was a claim for his resignation: "Let’s throw them
all out, let’s not leave a single one there" became the slogan of the mobilizations. On
December 20, the mobilizations continued, although this time they were invoked by social
and political organizations. Violent police action to clear the vicinity of the government
buildings, led to intense clashes with demonstrators.
In the end, the President was forced to resign due to lack of support and legitimacy to
continue in office. The PJ, the main opposition party, imposed the terms of the succession.
After a chaotic succession of several provisional presidents, Eduardo Duhalde, PJ senator
and a former presidential candidate who had been defeated by de La Rúa in 1999, assumed
the presidency. 
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This frustration continued for several months. A tendency of autonomy in the streets could
be noticed among different social groups. Neighborhood assemblies sought to extend
citizen outrage aiming at social change.
Unemployed workers collectively took over the companies they used to work for before the
crisis, and the picket movement which had emerged in the late 1990s gathered strength
and widened its mobilization capacity. This was a time when the public space became the
stage for assemblies and direct action. It was also the time for experimenting and
searching for alternative forms of production and culture.
The protest posed a serious challenge to the provisional government. One of the ways in
which the government responded was by using repression.
The murder of two militants in a picket protest on June 26, 2002, unleashed a wave of
indignation and protest which prompted a change in the government’s strategy: it called for
elections as a way out of the crisis of legitimacy. President Kirchner would be enshrined
into government during these elections.
The resistance to the processes of expropriation and exclusion, and the actions
challenging the existing political order, severely curtailed the viability of government
policies and created the scenario which led to the fall of de la Rúa.
Even though other political actors and political moves played a key role in his fall and in
ushering a political transition, the way in which it happened cannot be explained without
the presence of collective action in the streets – an action which had more to do with
dismissing than establishing: it expressed a power of veto rather than the capacity to build
a political alternative.
These events during times of the crisis, however, left a deep imprint: a legacy of a new
culture of battle with a strong tendency for direct action and disobedience to authority
which could be activated and recreated in the future. 
But, above all, they left the idea that the smoke of politics in the streets can always come
back dormant in the citizens’ collective memory. Collective action thus became established
as a dismissing threat for the future.
Mobilizations from “above”
The political cycle of Néstor Kirchner’s and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s governments
is marked by the imprint of the prevailing tendencies from the previous period, and belongs
within the wide range of experiences of Latin American progressive governments.
The origin of Néstor Kirchner’s government was marked by the general crisis of 2001. Even
though it did not represent the groups which had mobilized during the crisis, it sought to
recompose the country’s social order by selectively retaking the claims of the social
struggles of the previous period, and proposing a reformist agenda.
In doing so, politics regained some space and some degree of autonomy in relation to
economic power. Politically, it promoted openness and recognition for the mobilized
actors, and actively worked towards granting their demands. This is why the trade union
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movement, the human rights movement and other social organizations gave the
government significant support throughout the cycle.
As the cycle unfolded, the mobilization on the streets would not only originate from "below"
– that is, from the popular sectors - but also from "above" – the more affluent sectors of
the population.
As the cycle unfolded, the mobilization on the streets would not only originate from "below"
– that is, from the popular sectors - but also from "above" – the more affluent sectors of
the population. The political and institutional regression of the ruling classes led to the
emergence of mobilization processes to defend their interests.
These interests manifested themselves for the first time clearly in 2008 in the so-called
"farmers’ conflict". This conflict managed to politicize, mobilize and polarize society like no
other throughout this cycle.
In March of that year, the recently elected Cristina Fernández de Kirchner government,
aimed at resolving a fiscal problem in the making, raised the rate of the withholding tax on
the export of several grains, especially soya, and linked its fluctuation to international
prices.
The main agribusiness corporate entities united against this measure, claimed for its
derogation, summoned their affiliates to refrain from commercializing grains and meat,
and established road blocks to ensure the effectiveness of this decision.
Thus, a social movement was created which, similarly to those developed by the popular
sectors, focused on mobilization, direct action and assembly practice. The conflict
exceeded however the agrarian sectors and mobilization spread to encompass social and
political opposition to the government, especially by the sectors which were feeling
dissatisfied with its reformist measures.
In an urban country such as Argentina, the conflict involved and aligned the population as a
whole, paralyzed the country and depleted the supplies to the main urban centers.
The government finally requested parliamentary approval of the withholding tax measure,
but it was rejected in the Senate. A year later, at the general elections, support for the
government decreased markedly and it lost its parliamentary majority.
The second great moment of the mobilizations from above is the cycle of pot-and-pan
banging in 2012 after the overwhelming reelection of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner with
more than 54% of the popular vote the year before. These protests reached their highest
expression on September 13 and November 8, 2012, and April 18, 2013.
Unlike the farmers’ conflict, there was no specific issue for them other than anger and
opposition to the government. Unlike the pot-and-pan banging of 2001, its social base was
not the government’s own; on the contrary, even though they were massive, they did not
manage to transcend the core of the social opposition to the government and the upper-
middle strata of the population. 
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The main impact of these outraged crowds was in keeping the social opposition to the
government mobilized and in wearing down its electoral triumph, thus hindering the
possibility of its consolidation of a hegemonic process up against a weak political
opposition.
The mobilizations from above fulfilled a function of social opposition. They reached a peak
during two non-electoral years in which the political opposition was particularly weak, in
2008 and 2012.
In 2015, the calendar moved the axis from social to political opposition, and the cycle came
to an end with the elections of that year which were won in a tight runoff by Mauricio Macri,
who represented the most antagonistic political exponent to the Kirchner project.
Popular resistance to neoliberal restructuring
From the start, the Macri government has sought to implement a restructuring of Argentine
capitalism in a neoliberal sense economically and politically in terms of social discipline: a
framework for developing a growing repressive policy of the popular sectors.
One of the most significant obstacles to this restructuring program is social protest. The
trade union movement, the movements of the people’s economy, human rights
organizations, the renewed women’s movement, are the main components of the wide
umbrella of resistance to government-driven sociopolitical reforms.
A series of social protest in December 2017 clearly show, yet again, their political role. After
its victory in the mid-term legislative elections in October, the government redoubled its
commitment to counter-reform, with employment, social security and taxation as its core.
The pension reform, which consisted in changing the rate of pension increase, meaning
cutting them, constituted the axis of resistance. On the day the reform was to be discussed
in Congress, a massive mobilization by unions and social organizations outside of
Congress was fiercely repressed.
But most of the protesters managed to reorganize and re-entered the square. In the end, the
session was adjourned as the opposition demanded.
A few days later, broad social opposition to the reform manifested itself again in another
massive mobilization before a new congressional session, including a general strike. The
demonstration quickly turned into a confrontation between the security forces and
demonstrators in their hundreds who attacked the police columns with sticks and stones.
The repression did not dampen the indignation and, at nightfall, Buenos Aires and other
cities were shaken by pot-and-pan banging against the government’s pension reform.
The protesters tried to remain in the square despite the repression until, finally, the intensity
of police action managed to clear the area. Subsequently, the security forces went on a
hunt for demonstrators in the city center and deployed unusual violence, of a kind unseen
since December 2001.
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But the repression did not dampen the indignation and, at nightfall, Buenos Aires and other
cities were shaken by pot-and-pan banging against the government’s pension reform.
Finally, the project with some minor changes was passed. The reform went ahead, but not
without costs even among Macri voters. It also damaged the agreement principle existing
between the government and the leadership of the country’s main trade union regarding
labor reform, which has forced the government to withdraw the proposal from being
debated for the time being.
The result of the conflict shows that social protest, in conditions of weakness of the
political opposition, is a key to channeling social unrest. It has created obstacles and
forced some palliative changes to the government’s planned reforms but has been unable
to halt the general trend of social change.
The images of smoking barricades in Buenos Aires’s city center and of citizens protesting
with pots and pans in the neighborhoods, vividly recall some of the postcards of 2001 –
they show the validity of protest as a citizens’ political vehicle in Argentina today, and also
the difficulties to contain it through repression.
Final thoughts
In Argentina, in recent years, social protest has become an informal political mechanism
which complements the classical institutions of representative democracy, for expressing
demands to the institutional political system.
One of its central impacts in political terms is negative due to its main role is the
obstruction of government actions. Given the weakness of political parties, particularly
those in the opposition, protest appears as a privileged form of social opposition at various
stages.
This entails that mass protest cycles draw their strength from social sectors which are not
those who support the governmental alliances. In 2001, their dismissing character reached
such an intense peak precisely because a substantive part of the government's social base
was mobilized against it.
On the other hand, the population’s tendency to protest makes protest a relevant factor to
be taken into account for implementing public policies. Protest as a likelihood significantly
affects government decisions in several areas.
To summarize, attesting the political relevance of the negative side of protest does not
imply ignoring its impact in determining policies or incorporating new demands into the
public agenda, and its role in other areas such as culture and unions. We have attempted to
argue the strong relevance of one of its impacts.
In our opinion, protest has resulted more in the dismissal of rather than the installation of
governments, in resisting policies that in ensuring their effective implementation. But
pushing aside the hierarchy of impacts, protest is, undoubtedly, one of the forms that the
discussion on the destiny of the nation has taken.
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Above and beyond the current government’s resolve, it is a struggle which remains open,
and has the streets as its privileged stage for expressing itself.
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